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I. INTRODUCTION
James Thomas needed new glasses.' Not wanting to pay the
markup at an established retail store, he decided to try out something
a friend recommended: ordering them online. He found a pair on
GlassesOnline.com that looked very similar to a designer pair he tried
on at the store but at a much lower price. Thinking it was a great deal,
he placed the order. When they arrived two weeks later, he discovered
that the lenses were ground incorrectly such that the glasses were
unusable. E-mailing customer service produced an offer to take the
glasses back (shipped at his expense) and a thirty percent refund. Not
feeling that this was a fair offer, James looked into how he could get
the company to refund his full purchase price. The company, however,
had no resources in his state or anywhere else in the United States.
He begrudgingly accepted the company's offer and wrote off the
remaining seventy percent of the cost. James learned the hard way
that, to paraphrase one commentator on the subject, when you buy
something from a company in China and the deal goes sour, you need
to have a better plan than suing them in North Carolina.2
1. The following story is based on personal knowledge; the names have been changed.
2. Ethan Katsh, Online Dispute Resolution: Moving Beyond Convenience and
Communication, in THE ABA GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS NEGOTIATIONS 235 (James R.
Silkenat et al. eds., 3d ed. 2009) (quoting Peter Phillips).
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Online businesses have grown tremendously in the past
decade. As a larger percentage of the U.S. economy moves onto the
Internet, a larger percentage of people doing business online will find
themselves disagreeing with each other. How those disputes are
resolved presents an ongoing challenge in a world where traditional
ordering mechanisms, like geographical boundaries, become
increasingly antiquated. As contracts are formed across state and
national lines, dispute resolution systems built around spatial
locations become ever more unwieldy. The complications and costs of
securing a favorable decision from a far-off decisionmaking body make
reliance on geographic-based systems exceedingly difficult.
Out of this situation, a growing number of alternative dispute
resolution ("ADR") options have emerged. As technology evolves, many
of these ADR options include new, electronic dimensions. These so-
called online dispute resolution ("ODR") systems represent a blending
of traditional ways of solving conflicts while maintaining the
advantages of operating online. By creating problem-solving systems
which themselves cross borders, ODR systems represent one of the
most promising means of ensuring that problems will be fairly
resolved. The rate of adoption of ODR procedures, however, remains
relatively slow. Despite the need for such systems, many companies
opt to leave the issue to be resolved by customers on a case-by-case
basis. As a result, many online customers have little confidence that
disputes can be taken to anyone but the company with which the
consumer transacted. For some potential customers, the risks of doing
business online may remain too great.
This Note is intended to advance the debate about ODR
adoption by suggesting a new approach. While much has been written
about what an ODR system should look like, the question of how any
such system would be implemented remains problematic. Rather than
looking to create new ODR requirements country by country, this Note
suggests the creation of a new requirement for all businesses
operating online: that they provide an ODR process for their
customers which can fairly address the disputes that arise between
them. This new obligation would be enforced by the consumers
themselves, thus constituting a new weapon for customers to wield
against companies that mistreat them. The obligation would take the
form of a requirement in the domain name registration contract.
Should a company refuse to comply, a disgruntled customer could
initiate a proceeding which would result in the deregistration of the
company's domain name.
Part II opens with a brief description of how the Internet works
and how the registration of domain names provides an opportunity to
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regulate online behavior. It also gives an overview of the present state
of both ADR and ODR options for businesses and of the only currently
employed mandatory international ODR system. Part III describes
some of the chief benefits that could be realized through greater ODR
usage, as well as the problems with many of the current options for
expanding that usage. Part IV lays out the proposed system and
details how it could be implemented, and Part V addresses the
potential problems raised by the adhesive nature of the registration
contracts being targeted by this system.
II. MOVING DISPUTE RESOLUTION ONLINE: FROM ADR TO ODR
Both ADR and ODR represent alternatives to courts as a
means of resolving disputes. Both assist parties in reaching a
resolution, either by mutually arriving at an agreement or by
submitting the matter to a third party. In many instances, ADR is
both less expensive and less time consuming than a traditional court
proceeding, accounting for a great deal of its appeal. 3 While ADR, and
to a lesser extent ODR, enjoy formal recognition by most governments,
only the parties themselves may invoke them. Parties frequently do
this via a pre-existing contract specifying the type of procedure to be
used and the law or rules that apply to the dispute. 4 Courts are
involved only as needed for enforcement of a valid and binding
decision or, in a case where the ADR procedure failed, to pick up the
matter after the parties have exhausted the ADR process.
5
This Part begins by describing the basic framework of the
Internet, the operation of domain names, and the regulation of those
domain names. It proceeds into a discussion of the current types of
ADR methods generally employed by parties seeking to avoid court
appearances, as well as the sorts of ODR procedures which may be
found in use today. A brief overview of the attempts of online
businesses to promote consumer trust in online transactions follows:
first, an examination of the historical development of ODR providers
and their growing use by online businesses, and second, a description
of the nascent market in trustmarks, which attempt to encourage
consumer confidence through voluntary self-regulation of online
businesses. Finally, this Part describes the first international
3. See Orna Rabinovich-Einy, Balancing the Scales: The Ford-Firestone Case, the Internet,
and the Future Dispute Resolution Landscape, 6 YALE J.L. & TECH. 1, 22 (2003).
4. Id.
5. See generally MARTIN SHAPIRO, COURTS: A COMPARATIVE AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS
(1981) (describing the role of courts in arbitration of disputes generally).
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mandatory ODR system along with its implications for creating
broader regulatory controls over Internet transactions.
A. Getting Around on the Internet: A Primer6
The Internet began as a means for the Department of Defense
to ensure computer communication among its researchers and staff,
even in a time of war.7 Even as the volume of connected computers
increased, it has remained in essence a network of different machines
containing files for access ("sites") and the pointers showing other
computers how to get to those files ("addresses").8 While the technical
nature of the connections between these computers is unimportant for
the present analysis, what does matter is that each of these sites must
be given a unique address. 9 The computers involved use a series of
numbers to identify themselves, their "Internet Protocol address" or
"IP address."10 The address will comprise a group of numbers each
separated by a "." and will point any computer looking up that address
to the appropriate server. 1 Early in the Internet's development,
programmers realized that most people would not be able to easily
navigate through dozens of sites known only as numbers, so they
created Uniform Resource Locators ("URLs").'
2
The process of matching domain names with the IP addresses
they represent is done by accessing one of the Internet's Domain
Name System ("DNS") servers. A site's URL is how it is typically
found by users; a web surfer types "http://www.vanderbilt.edu" into
their browser instead of "http://129.59.4.44" to access the files which
make up Vanderbilt University's web page. The DNS process matches
the text URL with the correct IP address and points the computer to
the appropriate server to find the site. Browsers access sites by
6. I include this section to ensure that readers understand the basic terminology used
throughout this Note. Readers already familiar with terms such as URL, gTLD, and ICANN may
want to skip ahead to the next Subpart. For a more complete overview of the technical topics
discussed here, see, for example, PRESTON GRALLA, HOW THE INTERNET WORKS (8th ed. 2006).
For an excellent treatment of the history of the Internet and many of the legal issues created by
it, see generally JACK GOLDSMITH & TIM Wu, WHO CONTROLS THE INTERNET?: ILLUSIONS OF A
BORDERLESS WORLD (2006); INTERNET GOVERNANCE: INFRASTRUCTURE AND INSTITUTIONS (Lee
A. Bygrave & Jon Bing eds., 2009).
7. Maureen A. O'Rourke, Fencing Cyberspace: Drawing Borders in a Virtual World, 82
MINN. L. REV. 609, 615-16 (1998).
8. GRALLA, supra note 6, at 4- (providing a basic overview of the Internet).






making use of the given host and domain names. 13 In the example
above, the host name is "www." and the domain name is
"vanderbilt.edu."'14 Each part of the domain name occupies its own
place in a hierarchy. The rightmost portion of the name specifies the
top-level domain.' 5 The most commonly used are called generic Top-
Level Domains ("gTLDs"). 16 There are currently twenty-two gTLDs,
including ".com," ".edu," ".org," and ".gov."' 7 There are also top-level
domains for each country (the country-code Top Level Domains, or
"ccTLDs"), including ".au," ".uk," and ".cn."' 8 The name to the left of
the top-level domain is the second-level domain. Every second-level
domain within a given top-level domain must be unique. 19 Thus, while
there cannot be two different sites with the domain name
"vanderbilt.edu," there can be a separate "vanderbilt.com." 20 Likewise,
any subsequent level must be unique within the level before it. For
example, in the domain name "bbc.co.uk," "bbc" is a unique third-level
domain within the second-level domain ".co," which is itself unique to
the ccTLD ".uk." Accessing "www.bbc.co.uk" directs the browser to a
specific host server-the one named "www."-located at the
"bbc.co.uk" domain name.
The issue of control of the DNS servers and the maintenance of
the list of top-level domain names has been discussed extensively.
2'
For present purposes, it suffices to say that since the U.S. government
funded the research that built the Internet, it has continuously
occupied the central role in determining who can design and
13. Id. at 28.
14. The "http" portion refers to the type of protocol used to find the site in question. It
functions to specify how the IP address for the specified URL is to be found. GRALLA, supra note
6, at 19-21.
15. Id. at 30.
16. See INTERNET CORPORATION FOR ASSIGNED NAMES AND NUMBERS (ICANN), NEW GTLD
PROGRAM: NEW GTLD PROGRAM IN BRIEF 1 (2009), available at http://www.icann.orglerltopics
/new-gtlds/factsheet-new-gtld-program-octO9-en.pdf.
17. Id.
18. Id. ("There are around 250 two-letter country-code TLDs (ccTLDs), which identify a
country or territory.").
19. GRALLA, supra note 6, at 32.
20. Perhaps the most famous example of this fact arose from the development of a
pornographic website at "www.whitehouse.com" in the late 1990s. See Jeff Pelline,
Whitehouse.com Goes to Porn, CNET NEWS, Sept. 5, 1997, http://news.cnet.com/2100-1023-
202985.html.
21. For one particularly good discussion, see A. Michael Froomkin, Wrong Turn in
Cyberspace: Using ICANN to Route Around the APA and the Constitution, 50 DUKE L.J. 17
(2000).
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implement the fundamental architecture of the Internet. 22 The current
organization tasked by the Department of Commerce with
maintaining the Internet's structure is the Internet Corporation for
Assigned Names and Numbers ("ICANN").23 Under the auspices of its
contractual relationship with the U.S. government, ICANN oversees
the list of all top-level domains, as well as the operation of the DNS
servers, called root servers, among other responsibilities.
24
While the general usage rights may be controlled by ICANN,
the specific registration of a new domain name is handled via a
separate registrar.25 That registration, however, is subject to the
terms used by ICANN in establishing the type of domain being
created, which are imposed by a contract between the registrar and
ICANN. 26 The person seeking to register a new domain name will
contact a registrar, which will then enter the proposed name to its
WHOIS database.27 The WHOIS database contains an entry for every
individual domain name registered by that registrar, along with
information on who owns the name, while the registry WHOIS
database has information on all domain names within a given gTLD. 28
The contract between the registrant and the domain name registrar
lays out the rights and obligations of the domain name owner, and
22. See generally id. at 43-93 (discussing the role of the U.S. government in the DNS
system).
23. ICANN is a nonprofit corporation, founded in 1998, that was tasked by the U.S.
government with coordinating the allocation of the domain name system ("DNS"), Internet
protocol ("IF') addresses, autonomous system (AS') numbers, protocol port, and parameter
numbers. About ICANN, ICANN, http://www.icann.orglenlabout/ (last visited Apr. 4, 2011). For
more on the decision to assign these roles to ICANN, see Froomkin, supra note 21, at 62-73; Jay
P. Kesan & Andres A. Gallo, The Market for Private Dispute Resolution Services-An Empirical
Re-assessment of ICANN- UDRP Performance, 11 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 285, 289-91
(2005).
24. Froomkin, supra note 21, at 91-93. See generally Lee A. Bygrave et al., The Naming
Game: Governance of the Domain Name System, in INTERNET GOVERNANCE: INFRASTRUCTURE
AND INSTITUTIONS 147, 151-56 (Lee A. Bygrave & Jon Bing eds., 2009).
25. ICANN Glossary, ICANN, http://www.icann.orglen/general/glossary.htm (last visited
Apr. 18, 2011) (defining "registrar" and noting that most domain names "can be registered
through many different companies (known as 'registrars) that compete with one another"). The
terms of the current Registrar Accreditation Agreement can be found at Registrar Accreditation
Agreement, ICANN, http://www.icann.orglen/registrars/ra-agreement-21mayO9-en.htm (last
visited Apr. 18, 2011).
26. ICANNFAQs, ICANN, http://www.icann.orglenlfaq#gltdrules (last visited Apr. 4, 2011)
('The rules vary depending on the nature of the gLTD.').
27. Bygrave, supra note 24, at 160-63; WHOIS Behind That Domain?, NETWORK
SOLUTIONS, http://www.networksolutions.com/whois/index.jsp (last visited Apr. 4, 2011).
28. Bygrave, supra note 24, at 162.
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therefore, ICANN's ability to shape usage rights online is extensive. 29
Other than availability, there is no check against what the name to be
registered is and whether there may be competing claims to that
particular name, such as a third-party trademark.
30
Once the registrant has secured the rights to a particular URL,
that name is then pointed at by a specific IP address indicating where
the coding for the site is located within cyberspace.31 Once a site is
active, individual web users can locate the site and, if desired, enter
into subsequent purchase agreements with the site owners. While
ICANN does not exert control over these third-party interactions
directly, ICANN can and does regulate certain aspects of how gTLD
users may interact with third parties, particularly regarding third-
party intellectual property rights.
32
B. Types of Dispute Resolution Practices
Dispute resolution, in its myriad forms, has advanced far
beyond the days when kings would mete out justice on a whim.33 As
courts the world over become increasingly back-logged and the costs of
going to court continue to rise, parties to disputes are turning to other
forms of dispute resolution with increasing frequency.3 4 The first
Subpart below describes what is meant by the term ADR today; the
second Subpart describes the types of current ODR practices.
1. The Forms of ADR
ADR generally refers to arbitration and mediation, although
the term can encompass any decisionmaking process by which both
29. For some critics, this ability to shape usage rights is one troubling aspect of ICANN's
broad scope of authority. See Froomkin, supra note 21, at 96 ("ICANN's conduct and the various
agreements it has entered into reveal that a substantial fraction of ICANN's activities go far
beyond the setting of technical standards.").
30. See, e.g., Domain Names FAQs, VERISIGN, http://www.verisigninc.com/enUS/products-
and-servicesdomain-name-services/domain-information-centerfrequently-asked-
questionslindex.xhtml#q6 (last visited Apr. 4, 2011) ("A user requests a domain name from a
registrar.... If it is available, the registrar registers the domain name with the registry, which
adds it to the registry database.").
31. ICANN Glossary, supra note 25.
32. See infra Part IID.
33. For one of the wiser of those kings, see 1 Kings 3:16-28.
34. Rabinovich-Einy, supra note 3, at 21-22.
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parties agree in advance to abide. 35 Arbitration involves the turning
over of the matter to a designated third-party neutral whose decision
will be binding on both parties. Mediation likewise brings in a third-
party neutral, but no decision can be reached without the consent of
both parties. 36 Also included in the term are various forms of assisted
negotiation. The purpose behind all of these procedures is to dispose of
disputes in a way which best accommodates the needs of the
individual parties. ADR is thus not necessarily a substitute for the
courts so much as it is a system which can stand beside the courts,
ready for individual parties to use as they see fit.
Congress first gave formal recognition to a form of ADR with
the passage of the 1920 Federal Arbitration Act.37 The Act made any
"written provision" in a contract agreeing to submit future disputes to
arbitration "valid, irrevocable, and enforceable." 38 There are a
multitude of reasons why a party may prefer arbitration or other ADR
processes over recourse to the courts. In addition to generally being
less expensive and time consuming, ADR can allow parties greater
flexibility in crafting the relief, as well as increased control over the
nature of the proceedings themselves. Parties may also opt for
confidentiality in the proceedings. 39 Altogether, ADR offers parties a
greater degree of flexibility in their dispute resolution process.
Decisions reached by ADR are also enforceable internationally,
to the extent allowed by the United Nations ("U.N.") Convention on
the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards ("the
New York Convention"). 40 Under the New York Convention, foreign
arbitral awards must be recognized by the national courts of the New
York Convention signatories and are entitled to enforcement within
the signatory countries. 41 The practice is muddled somewhat by the
lack of a clear doctrine on how to handle non-arbitration ADR
decisions and is further complicated by differing interpretations of the
35. See, e.g., Jack B. Weinstein, Some Benefits and Risks of Privatization of Justice Through
ADR, 11 OHIO ST. J. ON DIsp. RESOL. 241, 247 (1996) ("ADR refers to a variety of techniques,
each implementing different levels of privatization.").
36. Philippe Gilhieron, From Face-to-Face to Screen-to-Screen: Real Hope or True Fallacy?,
23 OHIO ST. J. ON DIsP. RESOL. 301, 306 (2008).
37. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2010).
38. §2.
39. Jacqueline M. Nolan-Haley, Court Mediation and the Search for Justice Through Law,
74 WASH. U. L.Q. 47, 54 (1996).
40. United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter New York Convention]; see
also 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-08 (codifying the treaty provisions).
41. New York Convention, supra note 40, art. H.
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degree of consumer protection which is required to be observed when
foreign awards are challenged.
42
2. The Current Types of ODR
The number of different methods of ODR used by ODR
providers will likely continue to expand as businesses continue to
innovate in the area. Currently, firms tend to use either manned or
automated methods, creating in effect two different types of
procedures which parties may use. Likewise, some methods rely on
establishing live communications via the Internet, while others are
conducted using asynchronous communication, like e-mail.
43
The manned, or interactive, methods of ODR tend to replicate
ADR methods online whereby a mediator or arbitrator is present
electronically to assist parties with their disputes.44 There are a wide
range of different providers offering varying degrees of party
involvement, options for cyber-juries, and other types of tribunals.
45
Many of these interactive ODR processes seek to recreate the sort of
proceedings which occur in the courtroom, including the filing of
pleadings, the gathering and presentation of evidence, and the
adoption of various rules of evidence. 46 One of the largest such ODR
providers, SquareTrade, handled thousands of mediation cases per
month,47 using a set of guidelines encouraging private resolution of
problems. 48 Since most claims were resolved in onsite chat rooms
without third-party intervention, SquareTrade demonstrates the
importance of simply having a convenient forum where aggrieved
42. See Donna M. Bates, Note, A Consumer's Dream or Pandora's Box: Is Arbitration a
Viable Option for Cross-Border Consumer Disputes?, 27 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 823, 867-83 (2004)
(describing the difficulties of cross-border consumer arbitration).
43. Melissa Conley Tyler & Di Bretherton, Online Alternative Dispute Resolution, 7
VINDOBONA J. INT'L COM. L. ARB. 199, 202 (2003).
44. Louise Ellen Teitz, Providing Legal Services for the Middle Class in Cyberspace: The
Promise and Challenge of Online Dispute Resolution, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 985, 1001 (2001)
('There have been several providers who have tried to translate the mediation process into
cyberspace.").
45. See, e.g., Current ODR Projects and Websites, UNIV. MASS. CTR. INFO. TECH. & DISp.
RESOL., http://www.ombuds.orgtcenter/onlineadr.html (last visited Apr. 4, 2011).
46. See, e.g., ICOURTHOUSE, http://www.icourthouse.com (last visited Apr. 4, 2011) (an
example of one such website).
47. About SquareTrade, SQUARETRADE, http://www.squaretrade.com/pages/about-us-
overview (last visited Apr. 4, 2011).
48. Given that many of SquareTrade's clients are eBay buyers and sellers, quick resolution
of these cases is ideal. See id. ("[The SquareTrade Seal is still widely regarded as the single most
trusted icon on eBay.").
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parties may go to work out the matter.49 Users' satisfaction rates
remained high, suggesting that the overall framework is one with
which online customers would be comfortable. 50 As interactive ODR
sites continue to attract greater caseloads and funding, one would
expect that the ongoing growth of standards of decisionmaking will
increase the confidence in online arbiters and mediators to render
decisions in a responsible and fair manner.
The automated, or non-interactive, forms of ODR revolve
around software packages designed to stand in for a human being
acting as a third-party neutral. In its most common form, the software
functions as a blind bid process, whereby both parties agree in
advance on the range of values for which they would be willing to
settle the case and then input some form of bid or settlement value.
51
The software then compares the proposed settlement figures to the
acceptable range and puts forth some form of settlement offer to both
parties. 52 If the offer is within the range specified, the parties can
agree to adopt the figure; if it is not, then they are free to either
continue with the program again or turn to a manned ODR provider.
The advantage of the privacy afforded by such a system is that parties
are freer to express private preferences without fear of disrupting the
negotiation process.
While the range of options available online will generally
remain broader than with traditional ADR, the principles remain the
same. Perhaps the single largest difference, other than the medium
used, is the ongoing question of the enforceability of ODR decisions.
5 3
While an arbitration conducted via the Internet should seemingly be
granted full enforcement in a U.S. court,54 the international
agreements on the subject as they currently stand do not explicitly
49. Id.
50. Over eighty percent of SquareTrade users have indicated they would use the service
again. Orna Rabinovich-Einy, Technology's Impact: The Quest for a New Paradigm for
Accountability in Mediation, 11 HARV. NEGOTIATION L. REV. 253, 282 n. 121 (2006).
51. See Teitz, supra note 44, at 999 (providing an overview of the "fully-automated"
settlement process).
52. Id.
53. See, e.g., Lucille M. Ponte, Throwing Bad Money After Bad: Can Online Dispute
Resolution (ODR) Really Deliver the Goods for the Unhappy Internet Shopper?, 3 TUL. J. TECH. &
INTELL. PROP. 55, 88-89 (2001) (proposing "international cooperation and agreement on the
enforcement of ODR settlements without resort to traditional courts').
54. So long as the court could be persuaded that the online arbitration resulted in an
"award" as the term is understood under 9 U.S.C. § 9 (2010), that award could then be enforced
via an order from the appropriate district court.
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address other forms of ODR decisions. 5 Nevertheless, as future efforts
at simulating the role of an arbiter or mediator via software will no
doubt improve the automated experience, the availability of a third
party to assist in the resolution process will continue to be important
to both businesses and consumers.
C. Dispute Resolution for E-Commerce
Conducting business transactions online, which is loosely
termed "e-commerce," is here to stay. In the United States, e-
commerce between businesses and consumers ("B2C" transactions)
has increased over 600 percent in the last decade. 56 But as the volume
of B2C transactions has swelled, the legal doctrines available to help
online customers resolve disputes with online sellers have had
difficulty keeping up. In this regard, the experiences of U.S. courts are
illustrative, as respect for the traditional limitations of personal
jurisdiction led to the application of a "minimum contacts" doctrine to
determine where an aggrieved buyer could sue. 57 The problem, as
James's story above suggests, is that this doctrine creates few
practical options when the damage request is low and the seller is in
another state. Moving the seller to another country compounds the
difficulty of bringing both parties into one courtroom. This realization
prompted the first ODR providers to begin selling their services
online. Simultaneously, online retailers have begun developing new
ways to communicate with their customers through the use of
trustmarks, which can serve as stand-ins for traditional indicators of
reliability and security. Both of these developments will be described
in turn.
55. See Ponte, supra note 53, at 88 ("It is ... suspect whether a court in another jurisdiction
will agree to enforce a decision reached in cyberspace that does not comport with established
legal, ADR, and public policy standards.").
56. Press Release, U.S. Census Bureau, Quarterly Retail E-Commerce Sales: 3rd Quarter
2009 (Nov. 18, 2009), available at http:llwww.census.govlretaillmrtswwwldatapdflO9Q3.pdf
(jumping from 0.6 percent of all retail sales to 3.7 percent).
57. See Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Corn, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1122-26 (W.D. Pa. 1997)
(applying the minimum contacts analysis and discussing some of the problems that arise in
Internet cases).
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1. Development of ODR
The first ODR option became available in 1996 as an online
arbitration center.58 This provider, called the Virtual Magistrate,
failed to attract more than a single case, illustrating the difficulties of
convincing parties to utilize such a novel system.5 9 That case, Tierney
v. America On-Line, involved the display of an advertisement by
America On-Line stating that it could provide thousands of its users'
e-mail addresses to those desiring a mailing list.60 The court ordered
the company to take down the ad.61 Following the Virtual Magistrate
experience, several other ODR options began to appear, including the
Online Ombuds Office, offering virtual mediation services; 62 iLevel, an
attempt at providing a public forum for mediation involving public
comment and voting on a complaint;63 and CyberTribunal, which
attempted to become one of the first cross-border mediation
providers 64 and succeeded in attracting several dozen cases. In all of
these first attempts at ODR, cases were difficult to come by, and
funding was largely derived from grants by organizations seeking to
promote greater acceptance of the ODR framework.
65
Many of the first adopters of ODR encountered a form of the
first-mover problem in that the online marketplace had not yet come
to fully trust the technology to handle dispute resolution. This lack of
confidence in the system would be enough to undermine any form of
dispute resolution. For early ODR providers, lacking the trust of their
potential users was enough to render them, by and large, little more
58. ETHAN M. KATSH & JANET RIN, ONLINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION: RESOLVING
CONFLICTS IN CYBERSPACE 2-3 (2001).
59. Id. at 56.
60. Frank A. Cona, Application of Online Systems in Alternative Dispute Resolution, 45
BUFF. L. REV. 975, 995 (1997).
61. Id. at 996.
62. See ONLINE OMBUDS OFFICE, http://www.ombuds.org/center/ombuds.html (last visited
Apr. 4, 2011) ('The Online Ombuds Office is a dispute resolution service for persons and
institutions who would like an online mediator to assist them in setting [sic] a dispute.").
63. See ILEVEL DISP. RESOL. SERVS., http://web.archive.org/web/2000120405O000/www.
ilevel.com/ (accessed by searching for www.ilevel.com in the Internet Archive index) (describing
how this dispute resolution service works).
64. History, CYBER TRIBUNAL II, http://www.cybertribunal.org/historique.en.html (last
visited Apr. 4, 2011).
65. See Joseph A. Zavaletta, Using E-Dispute Technology to Facilitate the Resolution of E-
Contract Disputes: A Modest Proposal, 7 J. TECH. L. & POL'Y 1, 11-13 (2002) (discussing
characteristics and shortcomings of early ODR systems).
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than social experiments. While the idea could work in practice, it still
had a long way to go to attain widespread commercial success.
66
Since the end of the 1990s, however, ODR has experienced a
modest boom. As more people are becoming comfortable operating
online, the willingness of individual consumers to turn to online
dispute resolution providers continues to increase.67 Latching onto the
entrepreneurial spirit, most ODR providers today are for-profit
companies seeking to specialize in resolving commercial disputes.68 As
broadband access continues to increase and the technology creating
convenient ODR fora for individual consumers continues to develop, it
is likely that the field of possible ODR processes will expand.69
2. Trustmarks: Improving Consumer Confidence
In response to growing worries of consumer fraud and identity
theft online, companies began adopting self-regulating policies
intended to instill greater consumer confidence.70 By creating third-
party entities to police common standards regarding security,
consumer protection, and the like, Internet companies hope to build
the same levels of consumer confidence as are enjoyed by their brick-
and-mortar brethren. 71 For instance, VeriSign offers businesses the
right to display its checkmark logo in exchange for a fee, but only after
the company has consented to a daily scan by VeriSign of its site for
malicious software and promised to use up-to-date data encryption
methods.72 Similarly, the Better Business Bureau allows companies
which comply with its standards regarding disclosure, privacy, and
security practices to display its Accredited Business Seal.73 The hope
of the companies using the trustmark is that a consumer who does not
have a relationship with the online seller will instead rely on her
66. See id. at 14-19 (discussing the progression of ODR systems from the early years to the
present day).
67. Id.
68. Id. at 15.
69. See id. at 19-21 (discussing the benefits of ODR that are likely to cause it to continue to
expand in the future).
70. See, e.g., Sunni Yuen, Exporting Trust with Data: Audited Self-Regulation as a Solution
to Cross-Border Data Transfer Protection Concerns in the Offshore Outsourcing Industry, 9
COLUM. Sci. & TECH. L. REV. 41, 53-55 (2007) (' The U.S. approach to data regulation is largely
predicated on a model of self-regulation.").
71. See id. at 54-55 (discussing some of the methods ODR companies use to instill
consumer confidence).
72. Id.
73. BBBOnline Business Program, BEVPER Bus. BUREAu, http://www.bbb.orgusbbb-online-
business.
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confidence in the company issuing the trustmark to feel secure in
making a purchase.
One of the proposed ways of building greater trust in an ODR
system is the adoption of national ODR principles and the
development of trustmarks which can serve as shorthand for the type
of procedure to be used on a given website. 74 Trustmarks can serve an
important role in the growth of ODR, with businesses being able to
quickly inform their customers of the sorts of ODR services which they
are willing to utilize in the event of a dispute.
Trustmarks are also useful for advertising the principles which
go into the awarding of the mark. Organizations which certify that
companies have satisfied certain standards of fair dealings can build
up their own marks, conveying a level of confidence in the operations
of the business that customers might not otherwise have.75 For
differing standards of ODR to become practicable, such marks are
likely a necessity in order to let consumers know what sort of program
they are consenting to at the time of purchase. Marks by different
ODR reviewing organizations would be one way of quickly informing
consumers of the sort of standards being used, much like how
customers are currently made aware of the security settings available
at online checkout. 76 If adoption of ODR systems is to be effectively
encouraged, trustmarks likely will have to be simultaneously
developed that are capable of serving this educational function.
D. The First Mandatory Cross-Border ODR System: The UDRP
Concerns about trademark infringement prompted the creation
of the first mandatory international ODR scheme: the Uniform
Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy ("UDRP").77 The UDRP is a
system of mandatory and binding arbitration designed to regulate
trademark disputes in domain name registrations. The system was
74. See Ponte, supra note 53, at 88-89 (discussing the need for international enforceability
of ODR agreements); VeriSign Trust Seal Product Deals, VERISIGN, http://www.verisign.
com/trust-seallfeatures-benefitslindex.html (last visited Apr. 4, 2011) ("[Any Web site can build
trust, credibility, and loyalty online with the Verisign seal.").
75. See, e.g., BBBOnline Trustmark Program, BETTER Bus. BUREAU, http://www.bbb.org/us/
SitePage.aspx?site=113&id=9005bld9-6a4d-45cl-8263-e8Olb6d5d44f (last visited Apr. 4, 2011).
76. See Ponte, supra note 53, at 87-88 ("ODR trustmark programs could provide consumers
with a level of confidence about their ODR provider regarding basic standards of quality and
fairness.").




adopted by ICANN in 1999.78 Because ICANN is in the unique
position to effectively regulate the majority of the Internet through its
control of the DNS servers, not just the operations within one
geographic boundary, these rules apply to all gTLDs regardless of
what the host country is for a particular website.79 ICANN
implemented the policy as part of its regulation of the gTLDs
currently in use.80 The UDRP does not, however, extend automatically
to ccTLDs, which are controlled by Internet providers within the
respective countries, if not the respective countries' governments
themselves. 8
1
The UDRP procedure was based on recommendations by the
World Intellectual Property Organization ("WIPO").8 2 Although not
without its critics, the UDRP has generally received positive reactions,
particularly from the business community.8 3  Regarding ODR
procedures generally, the framework established by the UDRP has
demonstrated the viability of regulating the interactions of Internet
businesses with third parties via the initial domain name registration
contract.
1. The Development of the UDRP
The UDRP is ICANN's answer to the cybersquatting and
improper use problems encountered by many businesses as they
migrated online in the mid- to late 1990s. Cybersquatting refers to the
practice of registering protected trade names or marks as domain
78. Id.
79. See About ICANN, supra note 23 (listing the first of eleven core values as "preserving
and enhancing the operational stability, reliability, security, and global interoperability of the
Internet").
80. ICANN and the DNS, ICANN, http://www.icann.org/tr/english.html (last visited Apr. 4,
2011).
81. Cf. Domain Name Dispute Resolution Service for Country Code Top Level Domains
(ccTLDs), WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., http://www.wipo.intlamc/en/domains/cctld (last visited
Apr. 4, 2011) (listing dispute resolution resources for users who wish to register ccTLD domain
names or file disputes in relation to such names).
82. WIPO Guide to the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (UDRP), WORLD
INTELL. PROP. ORG., http://www.wipo.int/amc/enIdomains/guide/index.html#al (last visited Apr.
4, 2011) [hereinafter WIPO Guide]. For an overview of the argument that UDRP procedures are
unfair as applied, see A. Michael Froomkin ICANN's "Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy"-
Causes and Partial Cures, 67 BROOK. L. REV. 605 (2002); see also Viktor Mayer-Schonberger &
Malte Ziewitz, Jefferson Rebuffed: The United States and the Future of Internet Governance, 8
COLUM. Sci. & TECH. L. REV. 188, 194 n.31 (2007) (collecting other criticisms of the UDRP).
83. See Julia H6rnle, The Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Procedure: Is Too
Much of a Good Thing a Bad Thing?, 11 SMU SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 253, 257-71 (2008)
(discussing strengths and weaknesses of the UDRP).
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names with the intent of then selling the registration to the owner of
the trade name or mark, usually at exorbitant rates.84 Alternatively,
companies with famous brands saw sites being registered using
intentional misspellings so as to redirect traffic intended for one
company to the site of another.8 5 In both situations, the owner of a
protected mark had a difficult road ahead to shut down the infringing
user. Court filings are only effective when the owner can locate the
infringing user's home country and either secure a judgment there or
have a foreign judgment enforced there.8 6 This takes time and may be
ineffective, depending on where the infringer located her operations.
87
The UDRP creates a quick and low-cost alternative to court
judgments against infringing domain names.88 Any third-party right
holder believing that the domain name in question impermissibly
infringes upon her mark may initiate a claim. The owner of the gTLD
registration is bound by her contract with her chosen registrar, and
the UDRP policy as enacted by ICANN, to submit to the UDRP
proceedings.8 9 At the time of filing a complaint, the third party selects
one of several pre-approved ODR providers to use.90 The process then
proceeds as a binding arbitration between the parties, with the
84. John D. Mercer, Note, Cybersquatting: Blackmail on the Information Superhighway, 6
B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 11, 14 (2000) ("[C]ybersquatting occurs when an individual or corporation
registers a domain name that is spelled the same as a pre-existing trademark, and demands
money from the trademark owner before the registrant will release the domain name.").
85. This is considered "typosquatting." See Christopher G. Clark, Note, The Truth in
Domain Names Act of 2003 and a Preventative Measure to Combat Typosquatting, 89 CORNELL L.
REV. 1476, 1480 (2003) (yposquatting... entails identifying legitimate popular websites and
purposefully registering deceptively similar or deliberately misspelled domain names in order to
lure visitors into visiting unrelated-and often pornographic-web sites.").
86. See JULIA HORNLE, CROSS-BORDER INTERNET DISPUTE RESOLUTION 28-29 (2009).
87. See id.
88. It should be noted that the UDRP does not, as currently constituted, have authority
over the use of domains themselves. This has caused considerable consternation among many
mark holders in light of ICANN's decision to allow users to self-select their own domains. Soon it
will be possible, for instance, for this author's family to obtain addresses at a ".bowers" domain-
raising the specter of all manner of new possibilities for mark infringement. Where before two
different entities, one devoted to athletic shoes and one devoted to the Greek goddess of victory,
could content themselves to keep separate nike.com and nike.org registrations based upon each
organization's purpose, the proper owner of the future registration of nike.nike does not seem to
have a clear cut answer. See generally Release, Public Comment: STI Report on Trademark
Protection in New gTLDs, ICANN (Dec. 17, 2009), available at http://www.icann.org/enl
announcementslannouncement-2-17decO9-en.htm (describing the gTLD expansion and making
several recommendations about better protecting trademarks in the new system).
89. See Chad D. Emerson, Wasting Time in Cyberspace: The UDRP's Inefficient Approach
Toward Arbitrating Internet Domain Name Disputes, 34 U. BALT. L. REV. 161, 171-73 (2004)
(discussing factors that undermine the supposedly mandatory nature of the UDRP).
90. WIPO Guide, supra note 82 ('The Complaint may be submitted to any accredited
dispute resolution service provider.").
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registration holder having an opportunity to respond to the allegations
of improper use before a decision is rendered. 91
Two aspects of the UDRP warrant closer consideration in light
of the present proposal. First, the procedure offers only one remedy:
the transfer of the registration from the original registrant to the
trademark holder.92  No damages or other compensation are
available. 93 The UDRP is not exclusive, and thus a trademark holder
may opt for a traditional court filing with the accompanying broader
range of remedies. 94 However, in most instances, and certainly the
ones the UDRP was meant to address, simply shutting down the
offending site is enough to satisfy the proper right holder. Second,
with the UDRP, ICANN has in effect laid down a ground rule for
online participation at the gTLD level: no registrant in the cyber-
world may infringe upon a valid trademark. Given the dearth of
current regulations universally applicable online, this development
could be seen as either a welcome model for future "ground rules of
participation" or an intrusion into the communal nature of the
Internet.
95
When evaluating claims of improper use, the terms of the
UDRP require that a registration must be made in bad faith for it to
be transferred. 96 This bad faith standard has existed since the
program's inception, and after more than a decade continues to evolve.
The development and application of this standard represents one of
the first truly global adoptions of a form of quasi-common law.
Since its adoption, the UDRP process has overseen the
resolution of several thousand claims.97 It has proven attractive
enough that many countries have voluntarily entered their own
country codes into the UDRP process. 98 The primary criticisms of the
91. For a fuller description of the procedure, see WPO Guide, supra note 82.
92. See Holger P. Hestermeyer, The Invalidity of ICANN's UDRP Under National Law, 3
MINN. INTELL. PROP. REV. 1, 9-10 (2002) (noting the existence of and explaining the procedure).
93. Id. at 10.
94. Id. Even after the completion of the UDRP procedures a timely filed appeal to a court
invalidates the panel's decision. Id.
95. See id. at 13-15 (discussing a proposal by President Clinton's Secretary of Commerce).
96. Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy 4(b), ICANN (1999), available at
http://www.icann.orgen/udrp/udrp-policy-24oct99.htm.
97. See, e.g., Press Release, WIPO, Record Number of Cybersquatting Cases in 2008, WIPO
Proposes Paperless UDRP (Mar. 16, 1999), http://www.wipo.int/pressroom/en/articles
2009/article_0005.html (noting that over 2,300 UDRP cases had been filed with WIPO's
Arbitration and Mediation Center in 2008 alone).
98. A list of these countries is available at WIPO's Domain Name Dispute Resolution
Service for Country Code Top Level Domains, WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., http://www.wipo.int/
amcendomains/cctld/index.html (last visited Mar. 7, 2011).
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UDRP have focused on the pro-business results of most of the
decisions rendered under it. 99 Even among its critics, the basic
framework of regulating the activities of online domain name users as
they relate to the rights of third parties has not been questioned. 100
Given the practical impediments preventing any front-end analysis of
domain names as they are proposed, it is unclear what a more
effective system would even look like. At the very least, the UDRP
demonstrates the feasibility of relying on domain registration contract
terms to regulate the Internet.
2. Relying on a Third-Party Initiated Process for
B2C Protections
The UDRP arguably represents the first step into a wider array
of Internet regulations, designed not to be enforced by any singular
regulatory body but instead to rely on private enforcement via ODR
processes. It does so by finding a balance along two competing axes.
On the one hand, the intensity of resource allocation necessary to
resolve disputes must be balanced against the success rate of catching
wrongdoers. On the other hand, the degree of front-end control and
policing necessary must be weighed against the freedom of creation,
arguably one of the hallmarks of the Internet.'0 1 For the first axis, as
any police force can attest, the ability of a regulator to identify and
prosecute those who have harmed others is inherently tied to the
funding backing that regulator. 10 2 Given the paucity of resources
currently available for any system of global Internet regulation and
policing, it is clear that any overly intensive regulations of B2C
transactions will be doomed from the start. Additionally, the
complicated global nature of some of these transactions suggests that
the parties themselves are likely in a better position to police their
own transactions, calling in the assistance of an outside regulator only
in the most egregious of situations.
99. See, e.g., Michael Geist, Fair.com?: An Examination of the Allegations of Systemic
Unfairness in the ICANN UDRP, 27 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 903, 925-26, 929 (2002) (discussing a
number of cases where complainants were victorious in three-member panel cases).
100. See id. at 925-26 (noting relevant criticisms, not including those that address rights of
third parties).
101. ICANN's stated core values require that it respect "the creativity, innovation, and flow
of information made possible by the Internet." About ICANN, supra note 23.
102. See, e.g., THE EFFECTIVENESS OF POLIc ING (R.V.G. Clarke & J.M. Hough eds., 1980)




The balancing of control versus freedoms plagues international
discussions of new Internet regulations, 10 3 but again the resource
constraints are perhaps the biggest obstacle to widespread adoption of
comprehensive consumer protection regulations. Again, the
availability of funding for the regulatory body will determine the
degree of control that body can effectively wage. In order for B2C
regulations to take hold in the short term, they must be couched so as
to avoid creating too many claims for the system to handle. In many
ways, the U.S. approach of providing more freedom to businesses to
set the terms of the deal, at least to start out, seems to be the only
practical solution, at least until the financing question can be
resolved.
Finally, any system, once created, must be empowered to
protect an agreed-upon set of laws or principles. In this regard,
intellectual property provided an ideal starting point because of the
high degree of international cohesion concerning the treatment of
trademarks. 0 4 The inherent tensions between different countries'
treatments of contract norms and consumer expectations mean that
the B2C situation presents a more difficult arena to regulate
internationally. However, as long as the underlying system ties into a
standard of bad faith, as with the UDRP, there can be international
convergence toward what should constitute a violation.
III. THE BENEFITS AND PITFALLS OF USING CROSS-BORDER ODR TO
CREATE INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION SOLUTIONS
The trend toward the adoption of ODR methods is likely to
continue as e-commerce becomes more prevalent in the global
marketplace. 10 5 As more people turn to the Internet to do business, the
legal community has become increasingly aware that cyber-disputes
will become part of the permanent landscape. 06 The difficulties
103. See supra Part II.C. (discussing the developments of ODR and trustmarks).
104. See, e.g., General Information on the Madrid System, WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG.,
http://www.wipo.int/madrid/erigeneral/ (last visited Apr. 4, 2011) (describing the 119-year
history of the Madrid System of international trademark law).
105. See GABRIELLE KAUFMANN-KOHLER & THOMAS SCHULTz, ONLINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION:
CHALLENGES FOR CONTEMPORARY JUSTICE 5 (2004) (defining ODR "either as a sui generis form
of dispute resolution or as online alternative dispute resolution").
106. See, e.g., Am. Bar Ass'n's Task Force on Elec. Commerce & Alt. Dispute Resolution,
Addressing Disputes in Electronic Commerce: Final Recommendations and Report, 58 BUS. LAW.
415 (2002) (examining challenges within electronic commerce); Am. Bar Ass'n Global Cyberspace
Jurisdiction Project, Achieving Legal and Business Order in Cyberspace: A Report on Global
Jurisdiction Issues Created by the Internet, 55 BUs. LAw. 1801 (2000) (discussing adaptations
necessary for electronic commerce).
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encountered by many of the institutions which are currently in use to
overcome the cross-jurisdictional nature of online transactions greatly
complicate the problem of how to handle these disputes. 10 7 ODR is an
attractive means of resolving cyber-disputes, particularly the low-
value claims frequently at the heart of B2C-related disputes.
This Part begins by addressing the advantages, as well as some
of the criticisms, of ODR use. Additionally, this Part highlights one of
the greatest potential strengths of an international ODR system: the
possibility of the proceedings to tap into a body of universal trading
principles and thus bypass some of the jurisdictional problems
currently hampering international dispute resolution. Finally, this
Part discusses the difficulty of getting numerous nations to agree on
what the best practices of an international ODR system would be and
the difficulties of implementing such a system even with widespread
international agreement.
A. The Inherent Benefits and Concerns of ODR
Conducted via electronic communications (specifically
computer to computer, or "C2C") instead of the more traditional face
to face ("F2F") communication, ODR procedures present several
advantages to the average e-commerce consumer and seller. First, the
nature of ODR procedures means that anyone with a computer and an
Internet connection may access them.108 While ODR systems may in
time become a viable option for addressing non-online disputes, 0 9 they
remain ideal for cyber-disputes. 0 The fact that a dispute developed
online ensures that both parties have access to online means of
resolving that dispute, something which cannot be said for more
traditional measures.'
107. See Mohamed Wahab, Globalisation and ODR: Dynamics of Change in E-Commerce
Dispute Settlement, 12 INT'L J.L. & INFO. TECH. 123, 149-51 (2004) (discussing various obstacles
to the development of effective ODR).
108. See E. Casey Lide, ADR and Cyberspace: The Role of Alternate Dispute Resolution in
Online Commerce, Intellectual Property and Defamation, 12 OHIO ST. J. ON DIsP. RESOL. 193, 218
(1996) (noting that ODR "might appeal strongly to less sophisticated, individual parties with
cyberspace grievances").
109. See, e.g., Alejandro E. Almaguer & Roland W. Baggot III, Shaping New Legal Frontiers:
Dispute Resolution for the Internet, 13 OHIO ST. J. ON DiSP. RESOL. 711, 719 (1998).
110. See Robert C. Bordone, Electronic Online Dispute Resolution: A Systems Approach-
Potential, Problems, and a Proposal, 3 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 175, 188-92 (1998) (discussing the
benefits of applying ADR to online disputes).
111. While ODR has the advantage of ensuring that all parties have access to the system
when used to resolve cyber-disputes, the parties may still not have equal access to the Internet.
Depending on the method of resolution used factors such as connection speed, access to hardware
20111 1285
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
Second, the nature of the ODR proceedings does not
inconvenience parties any more than is necessary while the
proceeding is ongoing."12 Compared to a traditional dispute resolution
forum, there are no operating hours to contend with, nor must the
parties travel to a common location to proceed." 3 Documents may be
reviewed at each party's leisure, and all responses may be measured
and thought out (although the extra time may not always prove
advantageous). Perhaps most importantly, ODR procedures need not
interfere with the ordinary business practices of an online retailer any
more than a traditional proceeding.
Third, ODR proceedings are, generally speaking, significantly
cheaper than their brick-and-mortar alternatives. 114 For instance, the
cost of using a mediator on SquareTrade was only twenty dollars;"15
the filing of a complaint there was free." 6 This is especially important
in the online B2C context, as the average online transaction involves
only a little over $100.1" 7 Given that such small amounts are typically
in controversy, any system which requires large expenditures would
mean that the rational consumer would simply write off a bad
purchase as an unavoidable cost of buying goods online. Once
initiated, many B2C disputes need not involve outside counsel, and
thus, the only significant cost will be that of a third-party
decisionmaker, if one is involved.118
The low cost of ODR proceedings underlies another primary
advantage of these systems: the increased availability of judicial
proceedings for consumers. Given the costs involved in bringing a
traditional court case or even a traditional ADR proceeding, it is only
(such as web cameras), or other inequalities of resources may reduce one party's access to the
forum selected. Id. at 183.
112. See George H. Friedman, Alternative Dispute Resolution and Emerging Online
Technologies: Challenges and Opportunities, 19 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 695, 712 (1997)
('"The benefits are enhanced if the parties conduct the 'hearing' electronically, since the need to
deal with the logistics of travel vanishes.').
113. Id.
114. See id. (noting that communicating electronically is cheaper than faxing).
115. Ethan Katsh, Bringing Online Dispute Resolution to Virtual Worlds: Creating Processes
Through Code, 49 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 271, 279 (2004).
116. William Krause, Do You Want to Step Outside? An Overview of Online Alternative
Dispute Resolution, 19 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 457, 462 (2001).
117. See Press Release, comScore, Inc., Green Tuesday? Tuesday, December 15 Reaches
Record $913 Million in Online Spending (Dec. 20, 2009), available at http://www.comscore.coml
PressEvents/PressReleases2009/12/Green_TuesdayTuesdayDecember15_Reaches_Record_
913_MillioninOnlineSpending (describing the weekly average online retail sale figures for
late November and early December, 2009).
118. See Friedman, supra note 112, at 712 (addressing the economics of online ADR).
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with ODR procedures that a large swath of cyber-disputes could be
resolved. 119 While even a brick-and-mortar B2C transaction contains
some risk that the consumer will find herself aggrieved without cost-
effective recourse, the availability of ODR procedures would help
alleviate one of the most commonly cited reasons for people's
reluctance to shop online: a lack of trust in the company.120 Ensuring
that online transactions can be taken to a third party for resolution,
with little expense, in the event of a dispute would likely help allay
these fears.
Finally, the simple fact that ODR proceedings are C2C can help
avoid some of the problems inherent in F2F techniques. While there
are certainly advantages to conducting matters F2F, as will be
discussed in the next Subpart, the ability to avoid the emotional
outbursts and other potentially distracting circumstances associated
with an F2F meeting must be considered as one of the possible
advantages of an ODR procedure.
121
There are, however, several problems with the feasibility of the
widespread adoption of an international ODR system. First,
commentators worry about the availability of the hardware and
software prerequisites for any form of ODR to happen; namely, an
individual must have access to an Internet-enabled computer
equipped with whatever software the ODR process will require in
order for the procedure to be used. 22 Of course, this objection goes
more toward the impracticability of bringing ODR to non-Internet-
based disputes, since the fact that a dispute arose online establishes
that both parties are likely equipped to deal with one another
electronically. 123
119. See id. (addressing the costs of online ADR). Absent any allegations of systematic
consumer fraud, widespread breach of warranty, or other repeated harms, no common class
claim could be assembled either. What makes many of these cases so difficult is that the
businesses involved are getting it right most of the time, and so the residual conflicts with
customers are not the sort that are appropriate for aggregate treatment. See generally Jean R.
Sternlight, As Mandatory Binding Arbitration Meets the Class Action, Will the Class Action
Survive?, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 28-31 (2000) (emphasizing the class action requirement that
common issues of law or fact predominate over questions affecting only individual plaintiffs).
120. See Lucille M. Ponte, Boosting Consumer Confidence in E-Business: Recommendations
for Establishing Fair and Effective Dispute Resolution Programs for B2C Online Transactions, 12
ALB. L.J. Sci. & TECH. 441, 442 n.3 (2002) (discussing results of several consumer confidence
surveys).
121. Tyler & Bretherton, supra note 43, § 4.8.
122. Joel B. Eisen, Are We Ready for Mediation in Cyberspace?, 1998 BYU L. REV. 1305, 1336
(1998).
123. Friedman, supra note 112, at 707-08.
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More troubling are the limitations built into that equipment.
No electronic system can ever fully recreate the F2F situation, and
thus many of the sources of information available in a more
traditional ADR process cannot be recreated in an ODR system.
124
Losing out on the ability to view one's opponent and her accompanying
body language or tone can hinder the information-gathering process.
Additionally, the emotional release that can come from voicing and
having one's perspective heard-a release that can facilitate effective
settlement-may not be possible for the parties. The isolated nature of
online communications may in fact worsen the emotional situation of
the dispute since parties are not limited by ordinary social conventions
against using insults or other inflammatory language while discussing
their problems. 125 Cross-cultural transactions can further aggravate
this situation, since what is innocuous to one may not be to another
when interpreted through a different cultural lens.
126
The increasing availability of videoconference technology may
obviate these problems. A videoconference allows the parties to see
one another and experience some, if not all, of the benefits associated
with F2F communication. 127 Low-cost videoconferencing options are
expanding, and it seems likely that technological improvements will
help alleviate many of these concerns.
128
B. The Growth of a "Lex Electronica" and a Borderless
Approach to Cyber-Disputes
One of the principal advantages of the emergence of ODR
procedures is the ability to avoid cross-jurisdictional issues associated
with many cyber-disputes. 129 Since one of the hallmarks of online
124. See Eisen, supra note 122, at 1338 (discussing the danger of unequal resources within
ODR); Zavaletta, supra note 65, at 21 (discussing the effectiveness of ODR versus traditional
ADR)..
125. A quick visit to any nonmoderated comments section online will prove this point. See
also Zavaletta, supra note 65, at 21 (noting that the impersonal nature of e-mail can lead to
angrier statements between parties).
126. Id. A further interpretation problem is raised by translation issues, since registration
contracts and UDRP proceedings are in English. See Holger P. Hestermeyer, The Invalidity of
ICANN's UDRP Under National Law, 3 MINN. INTELL. PROP. REV. 1, 38-42 (2002).
127. Bruce Leonard Beal, Online Mediation: Has Its Time Come?, 15 OHIO ST. J. ON DIsP.
RESOL. 735, 737 (2000).
128. Consider the example of Skype, which provides for free video conferencing so long as the
individuals have computers equipped with webcams.
129. For a fuller discussion of this problem, see HORNLE, supra note 86, at 19-29, 44-45. For
an analysis of some of the earliest judicial opinions to address this problem, see Michael A. Geist,
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business is the potential to reach customers all over the world,
disputes can now arise outside the scope of the ordinary channels of
resolution. As U.S. courts have illustrated, there is no ready answer to
the question of personal jurisdiction in online transactions, and this
problem will only continue to get worse as cross-border transactions
become more commonplace. 130 Indeed, with the growing number of
foreign manufacturers selling their goods directly to consumers via the
Internet, the number of cross-border B2C transactions will likely
increase dramatically in the near future.131 It is not clear what, if any,
brick-and-mortar dispute resolution mechanism could adequately
handle a conflict between, for example, a Chinese eyeglass
manufacturer and an American customer.
With ODR, on the other hand, there is no limit on the ability of
B2C cyber-disputes to be resolved anywhere in the world, potentially
rendering the question of where the dispute originated moot.132 The
potential for ODR to avoid the jurisdictional issue may take two forms.
First, parties can simply contract around jurisdictional problems by
agreeing in advance to what dispute resolution procedure would
apply. 133 Of course, there are other issues inherent in contract
solutions to jurisdictional problems-most notably, enforcement. But,
the potential for more rapid and accessible resolution of problems
suggests that parties, with proper encouragement, may be more
willing to rely on their previously agreed-upon contract solution.
13 4
The Reality of Bytes: Regulating Economic Activity in the Age of the Internet, 73 WASH. L. REV.
521, 531-45 (1998).
130. See Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Corn, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1122-26 (W.D. Pa. 1997)
(determining what Internet ties are sufficient to establish minimum contacts); Kevin R. Lyn,
Personal Jurisdiction and the Internet: Is a Home Page Enough to Satisfy Minimum Contacts?,
22 CAMPBELL L. REV. 341, 342 (2000) (discussing whether or not having a home page is sufficient
to establish minimum contacts in a jurisdiction).
131. One of the more surprising aspects of online transactions is the ability to eliminate the
need for brick-and-mortar retail even in traditionally customer-service-heavy areas. Two ready
examples of this trend can be seen in the booming market for shoes and eyeglasses where
consumers buy the items online without having ever gone in for a fitting or seen the goods in
advance. See Sidra Durst, Shoe In, Bus. 2.0 MAG., Mar. 15, 2007, http://money.cnn.com/
magazines/business2lbusiness2_archive/2006/12/01/8394993/index.htm (describing the $3-
billion-a-year online shoe business); Farhad Manjoo, How to Get an Unbelievable, Amazing,
Fantastic, Thrilling Deal on New Glasses, SLATE, Aug. 27, 2008, http://www.slate.com/id/2198746
(describing several of the more popular online prescription eyewear sites).
132. Of course ODR has the potential to obviate jurisdictional concerns in much broader
contexts as well. See generally Dan L. Burk, Jurisdiction in a World Without Borders, 1 VA. J.L.
& TECH. 3 (1997) (discussing the international implications of the Internet).
133. See Zavaletta, supra note 65, at 26 (discussing potential options for arbitration).
134. See infra Part IV.
128920111
VANDERBILT LAWREVIEW
Tied into the potential to avoid jurisdictional issues is the
resolution of the choice-of-law problem via the application of a "lex
electronica."'135 The idea of a lex electronica parallels that of the lex
mercatoria used throughout Europe in the Middle Ages. The lex
mercatoria, or "law merchant" as it has come to be called, was a body
of international trading principles used by merchants at international
fairs and other transaction-heavy gatherings to immediately resolve
commercial disputes as they arose. 136 Based on principles of equity
and justice, law merchant principles were applied regardless of where
the transaction in question occurred. 137 Thus, any greater protections
afforded by a particular host country were sacrificed in favor of
expediency. Several commentators have suggested that ODR providers
could, and should, develop similar universal principles to govern
online transactions. 138 These principles would constitute a limited
body of substantive commercial law which could form the basis of B2C
ODR decisions. Such a system would move the debate away from
synthesizing different countries' approaches to B2C dispute resolution
and towards identifying the set of protections that online consumers
across the world expect when entering the online marketplace. Armed
with such a lex electronica, an ODR provider would be able to bypass
many of the choice-of-law issues that hampered previous attempts at
B2C ODR procedures.
C. The "Best Practices"Problem: What Form Should
International ODR Take?
Many of the difficulties in establishing widely used
international ODR systems are tied to the competing views of
consumer protection across countries. 139 Any B2C measure meant to
135. See Almaguer & Baggot, supra note 109, at 719 ("A formalized ADR mechanism,
grounded in custom, is a logical and natural step for the resolution of disputes that arise on the
Internet.").
136. E. Casey Lide, ADR and Cyberspace: The Role of Alternate Dispute Resolution in Online
Commerce, Intellectual Property and Defamation, 12 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 193, 196
(1996).
137. See Harold J. Berman & Colin Kaufman, The Law of International Commercial
Transactions (Lex Mercatoria), 19 HARv. INT'L. L.J. 221, 274-77 (1978) (describing how the law
merchant developed as a universal law).
138. See, e.g., Ethan Katsh et al., E-Commerce, E-Disputes, and E-Dispute Resolution: In the
Shadow of "eBay Law," 15 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 705, 725 (200) ("There may, ultimately,
be an overarching and indigenous law of cyberspace and a range of generally accessible legal
institutions and processes.').
139. See Bates, supra note 42, at 830-44 (highlighting the differences between the policies of
the United States and European Union toward ODR).
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stretch across international borders will have to satisfy these
competing views on how to adequately balance the demands of
consumer protection with the need to not overly burden business.
140
Much of the conflict surrounding ODR is based on the differing views
espoused by various countries about where the appropriate balance
lies.
The easiest means of illustrating this split lie in the divide
between the United States and the European Union, which, simply
stated, fall on opposite sides of the consumer/business protection
line.'4 ' Within the United States, policies meant to police B2C
transactions have generally trended toward allowing businesses to set
their own terms of doing business, including the inclusion of
arbitration provisions. 142 Generally, consumers bear the burden of
monitoring what those terms state and of ensuring that they are
willing to abide by them at the time of purchase.143 Excepting certain
extreme behaviors, courts generally uphold the choices of businesses
in dictating the terms of their sales, including with regard to dispute
resolution procedures. 144 The worry is that anything onerous could
disadvantage businesses compared to their foreign competitors by
increasing the cost of doing business, perhaps even driving businesses
from the marketplace entirely.145 Where the U.S. system does
intervene is to counter fraudulent or other harmful business
practices. 146 Instead of regulating the B2C transaction per se, the
focus remains on weeding out those B2C transactions which prove
particularly harmful to the consumer. 147 Thus, the U.S. position often
adopts a more hands-off approach when it comes to setting ODR
standards.
140. See id. (describing different views on protection).
141. See id. at 842-44 (elaborating on major areas of disagreement).
142. See Jean R. Sternlight, Is Binding Arbitration a Form of ADR?: An Argument That the
Term "ADR" Has Begun to Outlive Its Usefulness, 2000 J. DISP. RESOL. 97, 100 (2000).
143. Id. at 103.
144. See, e.g., Musnick v. King Motor Co., 325 F.3d 1255, 1258 (11th Cir. 2003) (noting that
arbitration agreements will usually be upheld unless the party challenging the agreement can
prove that the party will "likely" incur prohibitively high costs); see also Mitsubishi Motors Corp.
v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 625 (1985) (" '[Tihe preeminent concern of
Congress in passing the [Arbitration] Act was to enforce private agreements into which parties
had entered,' a concern which 'requires that we rigorously enforce agreements to arbitrate.'
(quoting Dean Whitter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 221 (1985))).
145. See Bates, supra note 42, at 831-35 (discussing attempts in the United States to control
arbitration costs).
146. Id. at 854 ("Contract defenses such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability may




The European Union, on the other hand, typically focuses more
on regulating the front-end transaction in the B2C relationship.
148 It
has enacted much stricter consumer protection laws than are seen in
the United States, and has generally extended those laws to ADR
practices as well.149 These protections limit the range of possible
dispute resolution options and also govern how any such agreement on
a dispute resolution procedure may be made.150
These differing views on consumer protection effectively result
in a serious impasse regarding international ODR standards.' 51
Simply put, as the example of the U.S. and the EU governments show,
there is little international willingness to compromise to any
significant degree on the amount of protection to be given, nor on the
nature of the agreement which establishes a dispute resolution
procedure. 52 Calls for international treaties establishing ODR norms
or standard practices are thus limited by the ability of the countries to
agree on practical regulations that will satisfy both types of
governments. Waiting on such a perfect negotiation to occur would
severely limit the ability of ODR practices to grow so that individual
consumers could rely upon their availability.
D. Implementation Concerns
Even assuming the relevant regulators could agree on
international best practices, effective implementation of an
international ODR system may be difficult. Several obstacles stand in
the way of any such ODR system, particularly in the areas of
financing it, enforcing the resulting decisions, and cultivating trust in
the system among its users. The financial obstacles of any
international ODR system have been the subject of considerable
discussion.153 Ultimately, any ODR system would have to be financed
by some form of tax levied against the users, whether in the form of
148. Id. at 838-42 (providing an overview of the European approach to regulating arbitration
agreements).
149. See generally Council Directive 93/13, Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts, 1993 O.J.
(L 95/29) (detailing European consumer protection policies).
150. See NICHOLAS LocKETT & MANUS EGAN, UNFAIR TERMS IN CONSUMER AGREEMENTS:
THE NEW RULES EXPLAINED 21-26 (1995) (explaining the EU's test for unfair contract terms and
how such terms may be struck by the courts).
151. See Bates, supra note 42, at 842-43 (highlighting U.S. and EU disagreements on
recognizing binding predispute arbitration clauses).
152. Id.
153. See Ponte, supra note 120, at 461.
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fees charged for the services rendered 54 or else as a general fee
charged to all domain name registrants as a cost of doing business
online.155 How to raise these funds in a practicable way is a subject
beyond the scope of this proposal.
Enforcement of an ODR decision is also potentially
problematic, even with the widespread acceptance of ADR decisions.
The New York Convention 156 ensures cross-border respect for arbitral
awards, and many countries have adopted its provisions. 157 In the
United States, acceptance of international arbitration agreements is
guaranteed by the Federal Arbitration Act, which allows individuals
who obtain an international arbitration agreement to enforce that
judgment in U.S. courts. 58 However, even in countries that have
adopted the New York Convention, the laws often still allow for
varying sorts of defenses against enforcement of the foreign award,
including those based on unfairness or unconscionability. 5 9
International respect for ODR practices will depend on the reliability
of the ODR practices, lest parties become able to secure unfair
judgments via unreliable practices. The wide range of opinions on
reliable practices, though, will make creating uniform procedures
difficult. 160 Some commentators suggest that prior to international
recognition and easy enforcement, systems of trustmarks should be
adopted. These systems would verify that certain ODR providers have
taken steps to ensure basic fairness of the systems being used.' 6' As
ODR procedures gain more widespread acceptance and usage, there is
little reason to doubt that easier international enforcement of ODR
decisions will follow.
Perhaps the greatest hurdle to be overcome is that of building
trust in the ODR processes themselves. No system of dispute
resolution can be relied upon or become widely used unless the
154. This cost could be assessed either to each individual user or the business involved could
cover the entire cost. See id. at 462.
155. It is not clear how effective such a fee collection scheme would be, given the variety of
domain name registrants currently operating and their ability to operate in countries having
advantageous exchange rates relative to that of the country of origin.
156. New York Convention, supra note 40.
157. See, e.g., 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-08 (2010) (adopting the New York Convention in the United
States); English Arbitration Act, 1996, c. 23, §§ 100-04 (adopting the New York Convention in
the United Kingdom).
158. 9 U.S.C. § 211 (stating that "[f]oreign arbitration awards will be upheld").
159. New York Convention, supra note 40, art. 11(3).
160. See, e.g., W. MICHAEL REISMAN, SYSTEMS OF CONTROL IN INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION
AND ARBITRATION: BREAKDOWN AND REPAIR 111 (1992).
161. See supra Part I1.C.2 (discussing how trustmarks can improve consumer confidence).
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individual parties involved have faith that a fair and enforceable
decision will be reached. In many ways, this has become a chicken-
and-egg scenario: trust requires greater usage, but greater usage
requires trust. Along with ensuring easy enforcement of ODR
decisions, the trust of individual consumers could be cultivated by
increasing awareness of ODR options and by encouraging businesses
to offer ODR possibilities to their consumers. By doing so, both parties
could gain increased knowledge, and, in some cases, direct
interactions with ODR practitioners, increasing the likelihood that
such systems could effectively develop over time.
IV. MANDATING ADOPTION: IMPLEMENTING ODR BY REGULATING
DOMAIN REGISTRATION CONTRACTS
Some international agreement on the acceptability and
adoption of ODR would facilitate the further growth of e-commerce.
Several mechanisms for doing so have been suggested. 162 Instead of
trying to create a universal ODR policy-particularly problematic
while the procedure remains in its infancy-one of the easiest ways to
encourage businesses to develop ODR procedures is to incentivize
their adoption. To put it more specifically, this Note proposes creating
one binding ODR procedure that applies a body of generalized lex
electronica principles. This procedure could be accessed by all
customers of businesses operating top-level domain names in the
event those businesses failed to adopt their own ODR procedures for
resolving B2C disputes. Doing so can take advantage of mechanisms
already in existence, while spurring the development of ODR
applications.
A. Regulating the gTLD Registration Contract
From the above discussion, it is clear that any short-term
international attempt to regulate B2C transactions should focus on
regulating the post-transaction situation instead of attempting to
enforce a wide array of ex ante consumer protection standards. By
following the example of the UDRP and applying its framework to the
162. See Bates, supra note 42, at 881-85 (discussing the legal problems that arise from
international e-commerce and proposals for addressing some of these problems); see also Edward
C. Anderson & Timothy S. Cole, The UDRP: A Model for Dispute Resolution in E-Commerce?, 6 J.
SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 235, 253 (2002) (discussing the desirability of a universal e-
commerce ADR system).
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availability of ODR procedures to aggrieved consumers, the
beginnings of an international agreement may be seen-specifically,
one in which ICANN implements a policy mandating top-level domain
registrants to provide an ODR policy to their customers. This
requirement would be enforced by creating a single international ODR
mechanism to police the ODR policies of individual companies for
fairness. These fairness determinations would be based on a lex
electronica-inspired concept of good faith and fair dealings, and thus
would sidestep the choice-of-law questions, at least as they relate to
the relationship of the purveyor of a website and her domain name
registrar. Allowing each individual company to select the ODR policy
that makes the most sense for its own needs will encourage private
ODR providers to develop a range of ODR services flexible enough to
meet the needs of any style of business. At the same time, the
pressure from consumers to encourage fair decisionmaking will
protect against overly pro-business ODR providers. Online businesses
would be compelled to devise dispute resolution processes, but this
requirement would extend only to making certain those processes are
fair.
1. The Proposed System
This Note proposes the creation of a mandatory ODR process
applicable to all B2C transactions online. Such a system could be
called an international ODR mechanism ("IOM") and would only
receive cases in two situations: (1) where site owners engaging in B2C
transactions have refused to implement dispute resolution procedures,
or (2) where users believe that the procedures chosen by site owners
are unfair. Using the UDRP process as an example, the goal of the
IOM would be to regulate the registration contract by creating another
"rule of the road" for registrants: all gTLDs which are used to engage
in commerce should plan for, and accommodate, the handling of
consumer disputes. Failure to do so subjects the site owner to binding
proceedings backed by the resources at play in the registration
contract-namely the registration itself or the credit card used to pay
for it.163
The proposed system would function as a backstop in all B2C
transactions to ensure that, regardless of where the parties were
situated, aggrieved consumers would have access to some form of
163. See Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Economic and Other Barriers to Electronic Commerce, 21 U.




ODR. The IOM is not meant to address the underlying dispute itself,
but rather the means, if any, used by the business to address that
dispute. This system would thus stand alongside, not in the place of,
traditional judicial remedies. 16 4 The goal of the IOM would be
fostering the growth of a robust system of dispute resolution within
the virtual world of the Internet so as to allow parties the opportunity
to avoid the problems of traditional adjudication. 165 The principles
guiding these procedures would be those of a lex electronica
surrounding a requirement of good faith and fair dealings in selecting
an ODR mechanism. The remedies of the central system, like the
UDRP, would not try to make parties whole. Instead, the IOM would
police the market to keep out unscrupulous merchants and to
encourage private parties to utilize private ODR mechanisms.
The IOM would be constituted much like the UDRP is
presently: with the introduction of a general policy requiring that all
online merchants provide for dispute resolution services for their
customers or else consent to the IOM proceedings and risk losing their
domain registration. 166 This practice would differ from that of the
UDRP in an important way, however, since the standard is set
intentionally low to allow businesses an easy way to avoid the IOM
entirely.167 Similar to the UDRP, third-party customers would initiate
IOM proceedings based upon the behavior of the domain name
registrant. When triggered, the IOM would have to decide one of two
questions: (1) whether the procedures adopted by the site owner were
in fact adequate to constitute a good faith effort to resolve the
consumer dispute, or (2) where the site owner has made no prior
attempt to resolve the dispute, whether the refusal to engage the
consumer constitutes a breach of the principle of fair dealings. The
164. Similar to the relationship of the UDRP to the courts. See supra Part II (explaining in
introduction how the ADR/ODR framework coexists with traditional courts).
165. See supra Sections II.B-D.
166. The UDRP requires all those seeking to register a domain name to make certain
representations, including that the domain name does not infringe on the trademarks of third
parties. See ICANN, supra note 96, § 2 (stating that one of the representations registrants must
make is that their domain names do not infringe on another's rights). ICANN avoided the
problem of having the policy only apply to new registrants by including a provision that
"maintain[ing] or renew[ing] a domain name registration" constituted making the same
representations and subjecting the owner to the same mandatory administrative proceedings if a
third party contested the registration. Id. While this language has not been tested in court,
similar language could be used to implement the proposed ODR policy and, if nothing else, start
generating public awareness of the desirability of making ODR available to online customers.
167. The goal is similar to that of state regulations regarding the purchase of automobile
insurance: what matters is more the insurance policy's existence than any particular details
about it.
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hope is that the latter situation would rarely arise. This is not to say
that the IOM procedure would be onerous to site owners, but rather
that the lack of control on the part of businesses in choosing the forum
would be incentive enough for them to set the rules before a dispute
arose.
The principles guiding the decisions of the IOM would be the
community standards-or lex electronica-of online transactions. One
goal of encouraging the growth of ODR systems in general would be to
more easily recognize the modern lex mercatoria principles that
should govern electronic transactions and thereby create a better
guide for online behaviors. 168 While this would mean the rise of a more
American style of consumer protections, at least initially, such a
minimalist approach would be easier to implement. The system would
also be capable of growing into a more comprehensive, European-style
system as the program develops, if that is the direction that parties
wish to take. 169 Indeed, for such a system to work, the IOM need not
be a stand-alone entity, separate from other ODR providers which
arise to meet the demand for their services. Much as the UDRP allows
the third party to select the decisionmaker in the case, so too could a
customer select from certain pre-designated ODR providers to act as
the IOM in judging the question of the adequacy of business-appointed
procedures. 170 The overall intent of the law is simply to force
businesses to address the sometimes difficult question of how to
ensure that their customers will have recourse in the event of an
unresolved dispute.
Finally, either through the adoption of a loser-pays arbitration
fee provision or the adoption of sanctions for frivolous claims, certain
procedural safeguards should be built into the system to provide some
protection to businesses against overzealous consumers. The goal is to
create a program whereby parties are fully incentivized to take action
on their own, lest they cede control over their site to consumers. The
168. See Thomas Schultz, Private Legal Systems: What Cyberspace Might Teach Legal
Theorists, 10 YALE J.L. & TECH. 151, 153 n.1 (2007) (summarizing several of the different views
on the role of lex electronica as it applies to online transactions).
169. Some have argued that such organically grown regulations are more effective at policing
a marketplace, since more onerous restrictions imposed by fiat tend to push against previously
established community norms. In these circumstances both compliance rates and the rates of the
reporting of noncompliance can suffer. See Alfred C. Yen, Western Frontier or Feudal Society?:
Metaphors and Perceptions of Cyberspace, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1207, 1226-29 (2002)
(describing how the Internet is a unique environment in which state regulation is less desirable
than private ordering).
170. See supra Part H.B.
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IOM should not create a club to be wielded by consumers any time
they want to take advantage of a business.
2. Practical Implementation of the System
Education of the parties involved is paramount for any ODR
system to work effectively. Especially important is convincing the
parties to take their disputes to new channels different from those to
which they have become accustomed. 171 While any new regulation will
require a fair deal of awareness-raising before it can be effective, the
UDRP example is telling, as the number of cases filed increased
significantly in its first five years.172 The proposed IOM would likewise
be expected to increase the public awareness of, and, hopefully, the
public desire for, widespread ODR options. For many large and
established online sites, any requirement for ODR options would be
redundant given their already established provisions. 173 For smaller
online merchants, such a new requirement would likely encourage
greater use of pre-existing ODR options. 74 In neither case would there
need to be out-of-pocket costs until a dispute must be submitted to the
selected ODR provider, creating a strong incentive for businesses to
resolve matters before they escalate to that point. In practice, the only
claims which would be expected to receive ODR attention would be
those that the company would have the greatest incentive to simply
ignore right now, since there is little incentive to resolve them. 75
As the proposed IOM system grows, the ability of the
communal norms to handle a wider variety of problems would
increase, as would individuals' confidence in the community to enforce
those norms. This is the primary benefit of a more robust concept of
lex electronica. In order to fully encourage individual consumers to
171. See Friedman, supra note 112, at 717.
172. See UDRP Proceedings Arranged by Commencement Date, ICANN, http://www.icann.org
/enludrp/proceedings-list.htm (last visited Apr. 4, 2011) (providing a comprehensive list of UDRP
proceedings between January 1, 2000 and December 9, 2006).
173. One example is the relationship eBay has established with SquareTrade. See supra
notes 47-48.
174. Most likely by simply selecting one of several ODR providers with positive reputations
within the business community, much the way businesses currently select UDRP centers.
175. Currently, reputational costs are the only real damage a company has to risk when
ignoring online customers' complaints. While these are real and can result in significant lost
earning potential, the prevalence of anecdotal evidence condemning many online merchants for
simply ignoring the "problem cases" or otherwise making it difficult for consumers to secure
adequate redress for their problems suggests that for many companies reputation may not be a
fully sufficient motivator. See generally Nicole B. Cdsarez, Dealing with Cybersmear: How to
Protect Your Organization from Online Defamation, PUB. REL. Q., Summer 2002, at 40.
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have confidence in conducting their business online, though, they
must be aware of those norms, and those norms must be enforced in a
predictable fashion.176 The growth of a lex electronica which generally
mandates online fair dealings accomplishes that goal by highlighting
and attempting to resolve the question of what exactly the term
should mean.177
B. Encouraging Private Alternatives
The ultimate goal of any ODR-encouraging system is the
creation of the appropriate environment for ODR procedures to
develop more fully. By mandating ODR services in B2C transactions,
the IOM would protect consumers by ensuring access to a convenient
dispute resolution forum to handle the matter instead of relying upon
the willingness of companies to adopt such provisions on their own.
Such a system would be shaped by the interactions between the
demands of both providers and consumers of ODR proceedings; this
interplay of interests is what will ultimately stimulate future ODR
growth.
1. Effects on the Providers of ODR Services
By requiring businesses to compete for customers based partly
on the quality of their dispute resolution policy offerings, the 10M
would help ensure that ODR service providers did not come to unduly
favor either businesses or consumers. Currently, the lack of
widespread adoption of ODR among online businesses has hindered
the rise of private ODR providers. 178 The overall availability remains
limited as many of these ventures have stumbled due to lack of
customers. 179
Also lacking has been the development of notification systems
to inform the individual consumers seeking to do business online of
the businesses' willingness to be subjected to ODR procedures. Several
solutions have been proposed, all related to providing some easy
identifier that customers could rely on. 80 Whether by using a series of
trustmarks or other form of easy identification by consumers, the style
176. See Friedman, supra note 112, at 321.
177. See id.
178. See Bates, supra note 42, at 843.
179. See supra Part II.C.
180. See Irina D. Manta, Privatizing Trademarks, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 381, 402-06 (2009)
(discussing examples of "Certification Marks").
20111 1299
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
of web order forms and other contracting devices must evolve to
include this additional piece of information.
181
In this regard, the providers will be competing with one
another for business clients, raising the possibility of certain providers
becoming overly critical of consumer claims in the hopes of attracting
more business. 182 To counter this problem, the proposed system would
offer two safeguards. The first is simply the role of the consumer to
choose among competing businesses. In this respect, the choice of ODR
provider becomes one more basis upon which individual consumers
can make their consumption choices. 183 Secondly, unlike with the
UDRP, any selection by the business of an ODR provider which has
too lopsided of a track record is subject to subsequent fairness review
initiated by the consumer via the IOM identified earlier. The fact that
both parties will be exerting pressure to become the favored party in
any ODR proceedings strongly suggests that impartiality would
become the chief stock-in-trade of ODR service providers and a
significant baseline on which different providers would be compared.
As the ODR providers work to develop a lex electronica, basic
concerns for efficiency and the competitive push for fairness identified
above will drive the creation of many of the features that people have
come to expect of adjudication systems, including publication of
opinions, records of past decisions, and the ability to predict with some
degree of certainty how decisions will be made in like circumstances in
the future. 84 Because of the technological advantages already
possessed by ODR procedures, it is likely that these fundamental
issues can become better coordinated than are more traditional ADR
181. See id. at 401 (claiming that such a system would provide for greater flexibility and
productivity than the current one).
182. Some argue that this has already been seen in the UDRP, as demonstrated by the shift
in complaint filing rates per arbitration provider after the providers began publishing their
decisions. Once mark holders could identify the organization with the highest rate of granting
the domain name transfer-WIPO---the majority of complaint filings migrated to that provider.
For more details and a breakdown of the numbers, see Pamela Segal, Note, Attempts to Solve the
UDRP's Trademark Holder Bias: A Problem that Remains Unsolved Despite the Introduction of
New Top Level Domain Names, 3 CARDOZO ONLINE J. CONFLICT RESOL. 2, 10 (2001). For a
critique of the system based on these disparities, see Jennifer Arnette-Mitchell, Note, State
Action Debate Reborn Again: Why the Constitution Should Act as a Checking Mechanism for
ICANN's Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy, 27 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POLY 307, 323-26 (2006).
183. This is the same rationale that leads consumers to consider such secondary matters as
security features on the page and the encryption offered at check out when making consumption
choices online. See generally Ponte, supra note 53.
184. The ability to publish decisions and tease out the underlying principles (or patterns)
guiding the decisions is something at which a web-based approach would be expected to excel.
See Friedman, supra note 112, at 711-13 (describing the strengths of ODR).
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processes.18 5 This open system allows individual industries to
determine what sorts of ODR procedures work best for them, thus
minimizing the potential for problems that could result from an
attempted one-size-fits-all approach.
2. Effects on the Consumers of ODR Services
Educating individual consumers of the existence and variety of
ODR services available is the first step toward seeing more
comprehensive dispute resolution taking place online. Arming
consumers with the information to choose between businesses based
on ODR options, though, does little good if the companies simply bury
ODR information in the terms of use and adopt a click-through or
other form of less-than-explicit acceptance. In order for consumers to
both be aware of and be able to choose between company websites, the
information about the company's ODR procedures should be made
part of the standard disclosure information available at checkout
online, as other trustmarks are currently.18 6 Allowing consumers the
chance to see and know what will happen in the event that a dispute
arises is a necessary step in the development of a more adequate and
comprehensive ODR system.
Another component of building consumer trust in an ODR
system is in ensuring the reliability and the perceived fairness of the
proceedings.18 7 As discussed previously, there are certain advantages
lost in the switch from F2F to electronic forms of communications,
8 8
and part of building a successful system involves counteracting those
lost advantages to the extent practicable.
Besides building consumer trust, encouraging more choices
helps alleviate concerns about adhesive contracts with companies
forcing consumers into particular dispute resolution options. 8 9 By
giving the system greater flexibility, it is more likely that individual
consumers will be able to find a system with which they are
comfortable.
185. See id. (listing ways in which ODR can improve on traditional ADR processes).
186. See Tietz, supra note 44, at 1015 ("[B]asic disclosure is necessary to protect the users of
ODR in the anonymous world of cyberspace.").
187. See Andrea M. Braeutigam, What I Hear You Writing Is... Issues in ODR: Building
Trust and Rapport in the Text-Based Environment, 38 U. TOL. L. REV. 101, 102-03 (2006)
(emphasizing the need for rapport in ODR).
188. See supra Part II.B.
189. See Ponte, supra note 53, 491-92 (reviewing issues that must be resolved before gaining
the trust of consumers).
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V. A STICKY ISSUE: THE ADHESION PROBLEM FOR
ICANN CONTRACTS
The problem of adhesion contracts presents one of the more
troubling aspects of any mandatory ODR system.190 Electronic
contracts are particularly troublesome given the ability of businesses
to bury the terms of the agreement within a website or otherwise
obfuscate the basic question of what, exactly, the customer is agreeing
to when making a purchase. 191 Commentators have rightly argued
that the UDRP represents one of the more extreme forms of an
adhesion contract in that all website owners must agree to the terms
established by ICANN in order to participate in any Internet
transactions.1 92 Creating a new system of mandatory ODR provisions
would represent an even more intrusive measure than the trademark-
protection measures underlying the UDRP.193 Additionally, by
incentivizing the adoption by businesses of ODR procedures, this
policy could actually increase the degree to which customers
unwittingly sign away access to certain forms of dispute resolution
while contracting online. 94 This Part begins by looking at adhesive
contracts from the perspectives of both businesses and consumers.
Next, this Part describes the U.S. laws governing electronic
contracting as an example of how such laws can increase the risk of
creating more contracts of adhesion. Finally, it develops an argument
as to why the problem is overstated, namely that it is a misnomer to
consider it a contract of adhesion to force an online business to live up
to the obligations of an equivalent brick-and-mortar facility, or to force
190. Generally, a contract of adhesion is one where the terms are set by one party and
presented as a take-it-or-leave-it decision. See Todd Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in
Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1174, 1177 (1982) (laying out, as one of seven characteristics of
a contract of adhesion, that after one party has laid out all "except perhaps for a few identified
items (such as the price term), the drafting party will enter into the transaction only on the
terms contained in the document").
191. See Anthony M. Balloon, Comment, From Wax Seals to Hypertext: Electronic Signatures,
Contract Formation, and A New Model for Consumer Protection in Internet Transactions, 50
EMORY L.J. 905, 933 (2001) (justifying mandatory presale disclosure of warranties in electronic
consumer sales).
192. See, e.g., A. Michael Froomkin, Commentary: Time To Hug a Bureaucrat, 35 LOY. U.
CHI. L.J. 139, 152 (2003) (describing the inability of parties to escape ICANN's UDRP-consenting
contract term).
193. Id. However, the adhesion problem could be mitigated by adopting a fair-play analysis
of the issue. See Anne Brafford, Arbitration Clauses in Consumer Contracts of Adhesion: Fair
Play or Trap for the Weak and Unwary?, 21 IOWA J. CORP. L. 331, 352-53 (1996) (providing for
reasonable stability and predictability, while ensuring fairness).
194. See Froomkin, supra note 192, at 153 (taking issue with ICANN having had successes).
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a consumer to accept a procedure for resolving disputes when
otherwise there would be none.
A. The Potential for Adhesion in ODR Selection Clauses
Both website registrants and website users have reason to
worry about problems of contracts of adhesion in the proposed ODR
requirements. For those doing business online, the proposed
requirement would function as a prerequisite to entering the
marketplace. For consumers, the worry would be that new terms
would be buried inside hard-to-find terms of sale or otherwise couched
in incomprehensible legalese.
195
The worry for businesses would involve questions of fairness
regarding the erection of new barriers to entry into what had
previously been a remarkably open space. When the UDRP was
enacted, its purpose was to counteract certain infringements of
intellectual property rights. 196 Both the regulated activity-selecting a
name under which to do business-and the right in question-the
third party's property right in a particular name-were identical
online and off-line. Conceptually, the UDRP operates much like a
court whose only remedy was a permanent injunction against an
offending party preventing that party from using a particular business
name.197 In that regard, an off-line obligation simply migrated online.
But the proposed ODR requirement differs in an important way: it
requires businesses to affirmatively enact and uphold an ODR policy,
as opposed to refraining from infringing on someone else's rights.
Unlike a court, mandatory ICANN policies cannot be avoided by
moving to a different jurisdiction. Deciding whether to comply thus
becomes an existential question for an online business. Forcing a
business to accept such an obligation based on ICANN's control of
gTLD registration agreements seems to be the very definition of an
adhesive contract.
195. See generally Mo Zhang, Contractual Choice of Law in Contracts of Adhesion and Party
Autonomy, 41 AKRON L. REV. 123, 153 (2008) (describing the two-pronged test of procedural and
substantive unconscionability).
196. WORLD INTELL PROP. ORG., FINAL REPORT OF THE FIRST WIPO INTERNET DOMAIN NAME
PROCESS 23 (1999), available at http://www.wipo.int/amclen/processes/processl/report/
index.html.
197. Such remedy limiting measures are themselves subject to considerable questioning in
the literature. See, e.g., Amy J. Schmitz, Embracing Unconscionability's Safety Net Function, 58
ALA. L. REV. 73, 111-12 (2006) (arguing that arbitration provisions that work to limit remedies
may in some instances be unconscionable).
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For consumers, the adhesion problem is not related to any
actions of ICANN but rather to the manner in which companies would
likely implement the ODR requirement. Terms-of-use and terms-of-
sale agreements can sometimes be difficult to locate online and often
even more difficult to understand. And as courts have indicated, not
taking the time to hunt down the terms of an agreement does not
stand in the way of a company enforcing those terms against a
customer. 198 Simply clicking through a form1 99 or even browsing a
page 200 can be enough to form a contract. In this context, forcing
businesses to offer forms of ODR may wind up undermining consumer
protection standards as small businesses which may not have realized
their ability to create adhesive contracts become aware of their
potential while researching ODR options. Alternatively, even
companies dedicated to protecting their own customers may well find
themselves in situations where trying to explain the terms of ODR
procedures to prospective clients is too time consuming or otherwise
bothersome, and they may begin looking to play hide the ball.
B. The U.S. Approach to Electronic Contracts
The potential for adhesion is exacerbated by the ease with
which most jurisdictions recognize the formation of an electronic
contract. U.S. laws are illustrative of this point, both because the
United States, as the home of the inventors of the Internet, has had
the longest exposure to electronic contracting, and because its laws
demonstrate the generally indifferent attitude the law may have
regarding protecting consumers from themselves online.
The Internet was not intended to function as a vehicle for
private commerce, but as research gave way to private use, its
creators eventually acceded to the demands for business to be
conducted online in 1991.201 Five years later, the U.N. Commission on
International Trade Law promulgated its first model law governing
198. See ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg 86 F.3d 1447, 1452 (7th Cir. 1996) (refusing to void a
contract on such terms); Step-Saver Data Sys., Inc. v. Wyse Tech., Inc., 939 F.2d 91, 98 (3d Cir.
1991) (same).
199. See, e.g., Novak v. Overture Servs., Inc., 309 F. Supp. 2d 446, 451-52 (E.D.N.Y. 2004)
(enforcing a click-through agreement).
200. See, e.g., Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d 393, 401-03 (2d Cir. 2004) (finding
that plaintiffs multiple uses of defendant's site meant that it must have been aware of the terms
of use, regardless of whether it actually looked at them before using the site).
201. ANDREW WYCKOFF & ALESSANDRA COLECCHIA, THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL IMPACT OF
ELECTRONIC COMMERCE: PRELIMINARY FINDINGS AND RESEARCH AGENDA 9 (1999).
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the formation of electronic contracts. 2 2 The model law specified that
contracts were not to be denied legal effect solely on the basis of their
electronic origin.20 3 It also included details on the nature of electronic
signatures and other principles of contract formation and enforcement
which were meant to increase the international potential for electronic
contracting.20 4 Following the passage of the international model law,
the U.S. National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws began formulating its own model law, culminating in the
promulgation of the Uniform Electronic Transactions Act ("UETA").
205
The hope of the UETA was to guide the formation of U.S. federal and
state laws, potentially avoiding some of the cross-jurisdictional
variation in the common law of contracts.
20 6
At the federal level, the principal law governing electronic
contracts is the Electronic Signatures in Global and National
Commerce Act (the "E-SIGN').20 7 The E-SIGN does not create new
substantive law on contracts, but rather was intended as a way to
migrate much of the existing common law of contracts into the world
of the Internet.20 Taking its lead from the UETA, the E-SIGN
afforded electronic contracts and signatures legal validity20 9 as well as
electronic copies of other records.
210
Problems of adhesion arise because of the ease with which
individuals may contract online. Both the UETA and the E-SIGN were
meant to be technology-neutral, meaning that no particular method of
forming an electronic contract was to be given legal preference. 211 The
E-SIGN explicitly prohibits the states from passing laws which afford
preference to any particular manner of forming contracts. 212 This
202. UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Commerce with Guide to Enactment, G.A. Res.
51/162, U.N. Doc. A1RES/51/162 (Dec. 16, 1996).
203. Id. art. V.
204. Id. arts. III-VI.
205. UNIF. ELEC. TRANSACTIONS ACT § 7A, U.L.A. 23 (2002 & Supp. 2004).
206. S. REP. No. 106-76, at S5,282 (2000) (Conf. Rep.).
207. Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 7001-31
(2006).
208. Benjamin Suksomnil, An Analysis of the Electronic Signatures in Global and National
Commerce Act and Its Effects on E-Commerce and the Online Consumer, 2002 SYRACUSE L. &
TECH. J. 2, § V.
209. 15 U.S.C. § 7001(a).
210. § 7001(b)(1).
211. See Amelia H. Boss, Searching for Security in the Law of Electronic Commerce, 23 NOVA
L. REV. 583, 601-02 (1999) (describing how digital signatures became the favored form of
technology used).
212. § 7002(a)(2)(A)(ii) (states may not "accord[ ] greater legal status or effect to, the
implementation or application of a specific technology or technical specification for performing
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arrangement is advantageous for contractors as it does not prevent
them from adopting new technologies as they emerge. The difficulties
lie with contractees, who may not be sufficiently protected from
unwittingly agreeing to disadvantageous terms.213 Since the E-SIGN
defines a signature quite permissively, 214 nearly anything which could
conceivably manifest assent may be used.215 One of the more heavily
commented-upon forms of electronic signature, the click-through or
click-wrap agreement, involves nothing more than clicking on an "I
agree" or similarly worded button.216 In contracts such as these, there
is little reason to believe that individuals have actually understood or
even read the terms to which they are agreeing, 21 7 and the resulting
lack of informed consent is what undermines any mandatory ODR
system. 218 Courts in the United States generally have taken a fairly
lenient standard when reviewing mandatory choice-of-law or
arbitration clauses.219  While the general trend is toward
enforceability, this area of law remains in flux.
220
C. Loosening the Adhesive: Creating Informed Choice
From both the business's and the consumer's perspectives,
these contracts may seem adhesive. In both cases, though, this
characterization omits the fact that if the B2C transaction took place
off-line it would already be covered by some form of mandatory
dispute resolution. As with the UDRP, such a provision would not
represent a genuinely new burden on businesses so much as a forcing
the functions of creating, storing, generating, receiving, communicating, or authenticating
electronic records or electronic signatures").
213. See, e.g., Jonathan E. Stern, Business Law: The Electronic Signatures in Global and
National Commerce Act, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 391, 406 (2001) (describing the technology-
neutral approach used in E-Sign).
214. § 7006 (an electronic signature is "an electronic sound, symbol, or process attached to or
logically associated with a contract or other record and executed or adopted by a person with the
intent to sign the record").
215. See Stern, supra note 213, at 395 (giving examples of different ways to manifest assent).
216. See, e.g., Christina L. Kunz et al., Click.Through Agreement: Strategies for Avoiding
Disputes on Validity of Assent, 57 BUS. LAW. 401, 401 (2002) (describing strategies designed to
give a margin of error to practitioners with respect to the validity of assent in these types of
agreements).
217. Id. at 423.
218. See generally Zhang, supra note 195, at 130-42 (arguing that there is a lack of
mutuality and lack of autonomous decisionmaking when accepting a contract of adhesion).
219. Ian Rambarran & Robert Hunt, Are Browse-Wrap Agreements All They Are Wrapped Up
To Be?, 9 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 173, 179-83 (2007) (reviewing the precedent in the area
of mandatory electronic contract terms from various jurisdictions around the country).
220. Id. at 182-83.
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of businesses to recognize and accommodate an obligation that would
otherwise clearly exist but for the nature of e-commerce in the first
place. One of the primary functions of any court system is the
provisioning of a ready forum to handle disputes as they arrive in a
venue which is convenient for the parties involved. 221 One of the great
disadvantages of the ease of transacting with anyone from around the
world is the sudden disappearance of such convenient fora,
particularly for cross-border transactions. The recommendation here
for the creation of a mandatory ODR process does not hinder a
company's ability to choose for itself what form of ODR to adopt, only
that it must do so. In that way, selecting an ODR procedure is more in
line with the goal of ensuring that B2C transactions may be easily and
cheaply resolved for the parties and that customers are not left
without recourse when problems arise with low-value purchases.
Consumers in the proposed system have two main worries:
(1) whether the ODR procedures businesses adopt are fair, and
(2) whether their decision to contract with a given merchant is made
fully informed of the consequences, particularly if the ODR provisions
of the contract are less than desirable. In response to the first worry,
the fairness of the ODR provisions would, in effect, be dually policed.
First, the online reputation of a company which treated its customers
unfairly in an ODR process would quickly turn negative. 222 Second, by
creating the possibility of appeal to a central, binding decisionmaker
any business contemplating harsh or unfair treatment of its customers
would be subjected to a review of its practices before a body of the
customer's choosing. Taken together, it is unlikely that customers
would be genuinely harmed by unfair terms under this proposed
system.
The greater worry would be for customers unintentionally
waiving certain rights or agreeing to unwanted procedures via click-
through agreements or other, similar arrangements. In this situation,
traditional unconscionability analysis would suggest that the
procedural flaws with the contract would be enough to render it
unenforceable and that the customer should be released from the
221. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1391, 1404 (2010) (establishing venue and allowing it to be transferred
"Iflor the convenience of parties and witnesses").
222. See Batya Goodman, Honey, I Shrink-Wrapped the Customers: The Shrink-Wrap
Agreements as an Adhesion Contract, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 319, 329 (2000) (discussing the
tendency of online users to share information among themselves).
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binding agreement.223 For electronic contracts, however, courts have
split on the question of whether difficult-to-find terms actually
constitute such procedural unfairness as to warrant voiding the
contract, or whether the burden lies with the customer to find the
terms in advance. 224 If, however, the presence of favorable ODR terms
becomes a point upon which businesses compete to distinguish
themselves, then it would become more likely that the consent to the
ODR terms was explicit and informed. While encouraging the
development of trustmarks and other methods of identifying ODR
procedures in use, basic customer education remains the best policy.
Even if trustmarks or other forms of consumer education and
notification are not put into general use, a worry of consumers clicking
away rights is not as much of an issue when the rights in question
would not exist but for the policy. The general worry of uninformed
customers being bound by disadvantageous terms in online contracts
is one which is not soon to disappear. Adopting the proposed modest
form of consumer protection would not actually harm customers,
though, even if they found themselves adhesively bound to employ
ODR.
VI. CONCLUSION
The growth of e-commerce is remarkable both for its rapidity
and for its ability to establish its own norms independent of
traditional mores. One of the areas where the Internet has outpaced
the ability of traditional institutions to keep pace is that of dispute
resolution, particularly given the ease with which well-established
concepts like jurisdiction can be circumvented. As consumers
increasingly turn to the web for their purchases, the potential for B2C
disputes will continue to climb. Without taking steps to ensure more
systematic adoption of fair and easily accessible fora to resolve those
disputes, customers will continue to remain hostage to the largesse of
the companies themselves for adequate resolution of their problems.
The crux of the problem is that so long as access to courts requires a
local presence, there can be no reliable way to bring in third parties
except when businesses decide on their own that such measures are
appropriate. Indeed, this uncertainty surrounding dispute resolution
223. See, e.g., Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 454 (D.C. Cir. 1965),
rev'g 198 A.2d 914 (D.C. 1964) (finding a contract unenforceable due to unconscionable terms and
describing the test to be used).
224. See Zhang, supra note 195, at 151-56 (describing the different courts' approaches).
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is one of the obstacles to be overcome in order for customers to trust e-
commerce as much as traditional avenues of commerce.
One such way would be the creation of a central ODR provider
responsible for ensuring that all online businesses offer some form of
ODR to their customers. The freedom to choose what form of ODR is
appropriate is what allows businesses to avoid any onerous
restrictions on their operations, while also creating the freedom of
experimentation necessary for the continued evolution of ODR
processes and technologies. Such requirements can be added by
ICANN into all new gTLD registration contracts. While practical
concerns--chief among them being financing22 5-have yet to be fully
resolved, this conceptual framework aligns the different parties'
incentives in such a way as to encourage the development of fair and
inexpensive procedures which would substantially increase a
customer's certainty that problems that develop online can be handled
online. By forcing companies to act and allowing the consumers
themselves to police results, the Internet's capability to develop its
own sets of community principles and standards could be harnessed to
articulate doctrines of enforcement on which online consumers could
rely. Removing the uncertainty inherent in remote business
relationships would constitute a substantial boon for Internet
businesses and consumers alike. And by doing so, the virtual world
could be made a little more like the real one.
Michael G. Bowers*
225. However, the trend towards businesses absorbing the entire cost of binding ADR
procedures suggests that ODR fees may become simply a cost of doing business.
* Many thanks to all those whose helpful comments and other support made this Note
possible, and to the editors at the VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW, whose guidance and help
throughout this process was superb. All remaining errors are solely the fault of the author.
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